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in the Age of Big Data 
David M. Parker*, Steven G. Pine**, and Zachary 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Big Data collections derived from medical records present regulatory 
and privacy challenges while holding significant promise for 
advancements in biomedical research. The growth of Big Data has been 
spurred by technological advances and the increasing use of electronic 
medical records. In this article, we explore how the concept of a rights to 
privacy and confidentiality for research subjects has developed, through 
both HIPAA and the Common Rule, as well as in the European 
Community’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We analyze 
how developments in regulations governing human subjects research 
reflect both a heightened societal concern for individual privacy and 
confidentiality and a recognition that research may be of sufficient 
importance to society to outweigh those individual concerns. We review 
how new efforts to improve informed consent procedures in the Common 
Rule fall short and propose a more frank and straightforward approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technical capacities to retrieve, transmit, store, and manipulate data 
and a concurrent push toward adoption of electronic medical record 
systems have fueled development and availability of Big Data collections 
of biomedical data. Such collections have already helped researchers 
achieve breakthroughs in understanding and treating disease, but their 
misuse can create significant privacy issues. Big Data presents enormous 
opportunities for the advancement of biomedical research, but unhelpful 
regulation creates challenges for researchers and research subjects alike. 
While regulation and enforcement trends appear to reflect increased 
vigilance about protecting the privacy and security of personal data, in 
some ways they also result in patients assuming that they have control over 
personal data that in fact they do not possess. Citizens are generally willing 
to compromise their privacy interests for the greater good, but that 
exchange should be based upon honest and informed transactions where 
research subjects knowingly barter for societal advances that may (or may 
not) also mean improvements in their own health and well-being. Evolving 
societal tolerance for collectivization of personal data and favorable 
attitudes about using biomedical data in human subjects research may 
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indicate that more relaxed and straightforward regulatory approaches 
would be acceptable, at least in the research context. 
In the remainder of Part I, we define Big Data and how its use in 
research involving human subjects has been fueled by technological 
advances and the rise of electronic medical records. Part II discusses the 
history of human subjects research regulation in the United States and 
current regulations addressing privacy and consent, both in the United 
States and the European Union. Part III will identify challenges with using 
Big Data under the current regulatory system. Finally, Part IV proposes a 
middle ground approach that balances societal benefits with individual 
autonomy by making changes to the broad consent standard. 
A. Defining Big Data and How it is Used in Research 
“Big Data” is a label placed with some degree of imprecision on the 
results of increasingly sophisticated capacities to obtain, store, and 
manipulate data in volumes and at speeds that were previously not 
achievable. More than simply a huge collection of information, Big Data 
can be conceived as having at least two dimensions in addition to volume: 
velocity, or the speed of processing data; and variety, meaning that 
different forms of data from differing types of sources can be assimilated 
into one aggregation.1 Thus, Big Data refers both to large, often 
heterogeneous databases as well as to the process of analyzing very large 
datasets.2 Such datasets can include primary medical data harvested from 
electronic medical records, research data obtained from human subjects 
outside the scope of routine patient care, and data from nontraditional 
sources such as fitness trackers and grocery store receipts that provide 
information on lifestyle choices.3 
Big Data allows companies and researchers, through the application 
of algorithms and artificial intelligence, to identify “patterns, links, 
behaviors, trends, identities, and practical knolwedge.”4 Such an approach 
presents complicated ethical challenges, and to some, Big Data can seem 
like Big Brother.5 Unlike traditional research projects where one person 
 
 1. See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Big Data: Current 
and Foreseeable Issues in Biomedical Contexts, 22 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 303, 309 
(2016).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Barbara J. Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in the Age of Precision 
Medicine, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243, 244 (2017) [hereinafter Evans, Power to the 
People].  
 4. See Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 71, 71 (2016). 
 5. Id. at 72–74. 
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consents to participate in one project,6 Big Data by its nature can affect a 
wider group or classification of people, and the ways in which it can be 
connected, repurposed, updated and used in a context entirely different 
from that in which it was originally obtained continue to grow as 
technology advances.7 Set loose from traditional technical and financial 
constraints and limitations on use, re-use and repurposing, Big Data 
stresses preexisting ethical concepts of research and informed consent.8 
The horse not only cannot be put back in the barn, it may no longer be a 
horse at all. 
Big Data in health care has many sources. Health care providers and 
major health systems have access to a robust array of clinical and payor 
data, both from enhanced processes for collecting and storing internal data, 
as well as through access to external clinical records, payor claims data, 
and lab, pharmacy, and provider data. In addition, health systems are also 
increasingly collaborative and may participate in an accountable care 
organization,9 clinically integrated network,10 or health information 
exchange11 where big data is bi-directionally created and shared.12 This bi-
 
 6. See Jacob Metcalf & Kate Crawford, Where are human subjects in Big Data 
research? The emerging ethics divide, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1, 2. This 
traditional concept of how people participate in research is somewhat undercut by a 
longstanding regulatory scheme whereby human subjects research is exempt from 
informed consent requirements involving existing, deidentified data because such data, 
once deidentified, are not deemed to involve human subjects. Id. at 1; see also 45 C.F.R. § 
46.102(e)(1) (2018) (defining terms used within the policy). Moreover, in some 
circumstances existing identifiable data may be used for secondary research without 
informed consent for that particular study. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (2018). 
 7. See Metcalf & Crawford, supra note 6, at 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Broadly speaking, accountable care organizations are “groups of doctors, 
hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together voluntarily to give 
coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare patients.” Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/ (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2019). 
 10. A clinically integrated network is a similar concept to an ACO, as it likewise 
generally refers to a separate legal entity that manages an affiliation of health systems 
and/or physician practices that have agreed to come together to coordinate the provision of 
health care services. See Accountable Care Organizations, AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY 
PHYSICIANS, https://bit.ly/2GcqKcU (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). Generally, a CIN refers to 
a legal entity established for an affiliation with respect to individual commercial plans, 
versus the Medicare-aim of an ACO. Id. 
 11. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) 
refers to an “[e]lectronic health information exchange” as a mechanism to allow “doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, other health care providers and patients to appropriately access and 
securely share a patient’s vital medical information electronically—improving the speed, 
quality, safety and cost of patient care.” What is HIE?, OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORD. FOR 
HEALTH INFO. TECH., https://bit.ly/2W5t5iH (last updated May 1, 2019). 
 12. Interoperability and Bi-Directional Health Information Exchange, HALFPENNY 
TECHS (Apr. 19, 2016), https://bit.ly/2GaDFej. 
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directional data sharing leads to health systems often wearing multiple hats 
when using big data and a health system might, for example, create data, 
own data, receive and transfer data, manage data, and conduct research 
with data. 
Health care providers and systems use Big Data to improve patient 
care through the monitoring of diseases and assisting in clinical decision-
making.13 Further, the rise of Big Data has led to a wide variety of 
secondary uses by groups both within and outside of the health system, 
including research, where it has demonstrated promise.14 But Big Data is 
also capable of being used to determine whether certain groups of people 
are more or less likely to develop specific health conditions. This use can 
lead to individual or class discrimination.15 
Secondary research uses of health care Big Data can trigger a variety 
of regulatory considerations.16 A health system’s use or transfer of data to 
other parties, including researchers, will generally require compliance 
with a number of state and federal laws, including the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 199617 (HIPAA) and the Federal 
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects18 (the Common Rule).19 
 
 13. See Anne S.Y. Cheung, Moving Beyond Consent for Citizen Science in Big Data 
Health and Medical Research, 16 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 15, 33 (2018).  
 14. “In 2016, noteworthy papers discussing secondary use of patient data focused on 
studying and improving the quality of clinical data, issues in sharing data, and predicting 
health outcomes using clinical data.” D.R. Schlegel & G. Ficheur, Secondary Use of 
Patient Data: Review of the Literature Published in 2016, 26 Y.B. MED. INFORMATICS 68, 
69 (2017). 
 15. See Henry T. Greely, Informed Consent and Other Ethical Issues in Human 
Population Genetics, 35 ANN. REV. GENETICS 785, 789–90 (2001). 
 16. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently issued a Strategic Plan for Data 
Science, observing that the wealth of data available to academic medical centers and other 
research enterprises through electronic health records presents both “great opportunities 
for advancing medical research and improving human health—particularly in the area of 
precision medicine—but they also pose tremendous challenges,” for example, in terms of 
data privacy, data security, and data interoperability. See NIH releases strategic plan for 
data science, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (June 4, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/news-
events/news-releases/nih-releases-strategic-plan-data-science. 
 17. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 
110 Stat 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 18. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2018) (“Part 46”). The Common 
Rule is currently followed by twenty different federal agencies. See Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://bit.ly/2txRR8I (last updated Mar. 18, 2016) [hereinafter HHS, Protection of Human 
Subjects]. This Article focuses on the Common Rule’s application to U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) requirements, contained within Part 46. 
 19. In addition, data that contains substance abuse records from an entity that receives 
some federal assistance and holds itself out as providing, or provides, substance abuse 
disorder diagnosis, treatment or referral for treatment, must be handled in compliance with 
the “Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records” regulations, located at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 2 (2018) (“Part 2”). Part 2 records are subject to specific confidentiality 
provisions that are more restrictive than HIPAA regulations. See id. While Part 2 is beyond 
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Failure to comply with these laws carries significant penalties. For 
example, under HIPAA, improper disclosure of protected health 
information (PHI) or other types of noncompliance with the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule20 or HIPAA Security Rule21 can result in the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) imposing corrective actions requirements22 or civil monetary 
penalties.23 Likewise, under the Common Rule, the federal government or 
an institutional review board (IRB) can terminate or suspend research 
projects for noncompliance with Common Rule requirements.24 Finally, 
other local or international penalties can apply, including sanctions for 
violations of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).25 
HIPAA and the Common Rule each address the use of big data for 
research purposes. These laws define “research” as “a systematic 
investigation . . . designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.”26 An activity’s purpose is often a key factor in determining 
 
the scope of this paper, researchers should be sensitive to additional restrictions on this 
type of data. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also has a separate body of 
regulations for clinical trials under its jurisdiction. See Clinical Trials and Human Subject 
Protection, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2G3ukEY (last updated Apr. 22, 
2019). While this paper does not encompass discussion of those regulations, it should be 
noted that FDA regulations have not been updated to match the Common Rule revisions 
and thus do not include, for example, broad consent or the HIPAA exemption. Impact of 
Certain Provisions of the Revised Common Rule on FDA-Regulated Clinical 
Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2GeIvZe (last updated Apr. 22, 
2019). For a discussion of the interplay between the Common Rule and FDA regulations, 
the FDA released guidance regarding how recent changes may affect FDA-regulated 
clinical trials. See David M. Parker et al., FDA Releases Guidance on How Recent Changes 
to the Common Rule May Affect FDA-Regulated Clinical Trials, K&L GATES (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2Ku3P0K. 
 20. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164(A), (E) (2018); see also The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2DhI0Jb (last updated 
Apr. 16, 2015) [hereinafter HHS, HIPAA Privacy Rule]. 
 21. HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164(A), (C) (2018); see also The 
Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2yFAda4 (last 
updated May 12, 2017). 
 22. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.312 (2018). 
 23. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.400–.426 (2018). Depending on the severity of the violation, 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) can impose civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 for each 
violation, not to exceed $1,500,000 for identical violations during a calendar year. See 45 
C.F.R. § 160.404(b). 
 24. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (2018).  
 25. Sanctions for violations of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
can be up to 4% of a company’s global revenue or €20 Million (whichever is greater). 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), art. 83, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 82–83, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 26. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102(l) (Common Rule definition), 164.501 (HIPAA definition) 
(2018). 
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whether an activity is designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge. That said, the HHS Office of Human Research Protections 
(OHRP), Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections (SACHRP) has advised that activities may cross the line and 
become research if the design, purpose, or resultant information of the 
activity contributes to generalized knowledge.27 
HIPAA applies to “covered entities”—a classification that includes 
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers that 
transmit health information electronically in connection with certain 
defined HIPAA transactions—as well as to business associates of covered 
entities.28 HIPAA then regulates a covered entity’s or business associate’s 
use or disclosure of PHI, including establishing whether patient consent is 
required for the use and disclosure.29 HIPAA applies to both research and 
non-research uses and disclosures of data by covered entities. 
The Common Rule is designed to protect human subjects in 
connection with research conducted or supported by one of twenty 
different federal departments and agencies, including HHS.30 The HHS 
Common Rule requirements are codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 46. The 
Common Rule applies to “human subject research”31 conducted or 
supported by the federal government or otherwise covered by an HHS 
OHRP approved federal-wide assurance.32 
For health systems with an affiliated research enterprise (e.g., 
academic medical centers), research uses of big data will often qualify as 
human subjects research under the Common Rule.33 Further, while the 
Common Rule may not apply to privately funded research, many health 
systems may have developed a federal-wide assurance that will apply 
across all institution activities, often known as a “check-the-box” 
assurance.34 
 
 
 27. See Attachment C – SACHRP Recommendations on Benchmarking, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2uTmc4T (last updated Oct. 28, 2016). 
 28. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2018). An ACO created as part of the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, or a similar entity created to organize a CIN, will generally not 
meet the definition of a covered entity as these entities do not fit within the definitions of 
health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse found at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
 29. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining “Protected health information”). 
 30. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2018); see also HHS, Protection of Human Subjects, 
supra note 18.  
 31. Human subject research includes, inter alia, research using identifiable private 
information. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1) (2018). 
 32. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).  
 33. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1), (l); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a). 
 34. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2UrcmGG (last updated July 31, 2017). 
 710 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:3 
B. Advances in Technology and the Push towards Electronic 
Medical Record 
Computer technology developed in the 1960s and 1970s laid the 
foundation for the transition to an electronic medical record, but the 
transition was far from immediate. In 2004, a random sample of U.S. 
healthcare facilities found that only 13% of respondents had an electronic 
health record system fully implemented, while 10% did not have or did 
not plan to have an electronic health record system.35 
In 2009, through the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, the federal government funded a $27 
billion incentive program for hospitals and providers to adopt electronic 
health records systems.36 By March 2017, 67% of all providers reported 
using an electronic health record system and, by the end of 2017, 
approximately 90% of office-based physicians nationwide were projected 
to be using electronic health records.37 
As medical records become increasingly electronic, there is a critical 
need for improved methods to mine the troves of data available.38 Effective 
and efficient use of electronic medical records in clinical research on a 
large scale presents a huge opportunity for advancing research. One 
example of the use of the of electronic medical records in this context is 
eMERGE, an “NIH-funded national network organized and funded by the 
National Human Genome Research Institute that combines DNA 
biorepositories with electronic health record systems for large scale, high-
throughput genetic research in support of implementing genomic 
medicine.”39 
Advances in technology have also opened the door to health data 
collected by mobile devices. The development and use of mobile devices 
and applications that collect health data operate in an interesting space in 
regard to health information regulation. HIPAA applies to traditional 
healthcare providers such as doctors and hospitals and, therefore, when a 
patient portal to an electronic health record (“EHR”) or mobile app is 
established by a health care provider, HIPAA will generally apply. 
However, this is not typical, as most health apps are built by technology 
 
 35. R.S. Evans, Electronic Health Records: Then, Now, and in the Future, 25 Y.B. OF 
MED. INFO. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S48, S51 (2016). 
 36. Brian Schilling, The Federal Government Has Put Billions Into Electronic Health 
Record Use: How Is It Going?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://bit.ly/2Kdj2mZ (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2019). 
 37. EHR adoption rates: 20 must-see stats, PRACTICE INFUSION (March 1, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2wwhlbY.  
 38. See generally NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DATA SCIENCE 
(2018), https://bit.ly/2JeSvRn. 
 39. Id. at 18. 
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companies that are not HIPAA covered entities.40 As a result, much of the 
health information collected by the devices and applications developed by 
technology companies fall outside the purview of HIPAA’s protections. 
Laws and regulations governing Big Data have failed to match the 
frenetic increases in complexity and sophistication of data gathering and 
management. In the United States, those efforts are complicated by the 
fragmented approach to regulating data and by the history and evolution 
of concepts of privacy and consent in regard to research uses of biomedical 
data. 
II. HISTORY OF RESEARCH, PRIVACY, AND CONSENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The regulatory foundation for any human subjects research in the 
United States is informed consent, or some regulatory substitution for it. 
Researchers are able to use big data collections drawn from medical 
records where the patient has authorized or consented to such a use, the 
project is exempt from the need for such consent, or a reviewing body has 
waived the need for consent in a particular instance. In the United States, 
concerns about privacy and confidentiality were not, however, initial 
factors driving the development of laws requiring patient consent to 
engage in biomedical research. The primary focus on many of these early 
standards was on the physical safety of subjects and how to protect them 
from harms and abuses of research. However, as research principles have 
evolved, they have expanded beyond a focus on physical harm to 
incorporate ideas intertwined with issues of privacy and confidentiality: 
fairness, respect, and avoidance of reputational or emotional harm.41 These 
concerns have come into sharper focus in recent years, with increasing 
awareness about data privacy, the value that health data can play in 
evolving research technologies, and growing concerns about the role of 
government intrusion in personal data. 
A. The Early Development of Research Consent Standards 
Early experiences of medical experimentation were tainted with 
many horrific abuses, where disadvantaged individuals were intentionally 
 
 40. Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data 
Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143, 181 (2017).  
 41. For example, in Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2008), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an individual has a privacy interest in 
his or her genetic information and can state a claim for injury by alleging that their privacy 
interest was violated. Id. at 1076. The court stated that “[o]ne can think of few subject areas 
more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than of one’s health or genetic 
make-up.” Id. (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 
1269 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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subjected to harm in the name of science. Public awareness of these abuses 
spurred the development of standards for the appropriate conduct of 
research and fundamental principles of obtaining informed consent from 
research subjects. 
Initial efforts at establishing widely accepted standards arose after 
World War II and the Nuremberg trials of doctors involved in the Nazi 
party’s abusive medical experiments. In a verdict in the trial of Dr. Karl 
Brant, personal doctor of Adolf Hitler, the Nuremburg judges, together 
with expert medical advisors, issued ten principles essential to 
“Permissible Medical Experiments” which came to be known as the 
Nuremberg Code.42 The Nuremberg Code’s first principle is directed at 
informed consent, stating that “voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential” to any type of research.43 Tellingly, none of the 
Nuremberg Code principles directly addresses confidentiality. 
In 1964, the World Medical Association, building on the principles 
established in the Nuremburg Code, issued the Declaration of Helsinki.44 
The Declaration has been updated seven times since being issued, most 
recently in 2013. The Declaration, while not carrying the weight of law, 
reflected a continued move in the direction of establishing enforceable 
standards. 
The Declaration reflects a refinement from the Nuremburg Code on 
the issue of consent. The Nuremburg Code’s directive that informed 
consent was “absolutely essential”45 did not leave room for scenarios 
where the acquisition of consent from an individual was impractical or 
impossible. The Declaration, in contrast, directs researchers to obtain 
consent if at all possible and further to take “every precaution” to protect 
personal information and the privacy of research subjects.46 The 
Declaration also prescribes multiple standards to develop the parameters 
of what can be considered informed consent; for example, requiring 
consent to be voluntary, requiring an adequate discussion of the study and 
its risks, and ensuring that the individual is aware of the right to refuse to 
participate without any reprisal.47 
 
 42. THE NUREMBERG CODE (1947), available at Laws Related to the Protection of 
Human Subjects, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2005), https://bit.ly/2YH73nz (last 
updated June 16, 2009); see also Nuremberg Code, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
https://bit.ly/2Iaippg (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). 
 43. See THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 42. 
 44. World Med. Ass’n, [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations guiding 
doctors in clinical research (1964), https://bit.ly/2Ta8Lsz (amended 2013). 
 45. See THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 42. 
 46. World Med. Ass’n, [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for 
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects ¶¶ 24–25 (7th ed. 2013), 
https://bit.ly/2rJdF3M. 
 47. Id. ¶¶ 25–32. 
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Notably, while not part of the initial Declaration, recent amendments 
specifically address medical research using identifiable data, biobanks, 
and repositories. The Declaration now directs researchers to seek informed 
consent for the collection, storage, and/or reuse of such data except in 
“exceptional situations” where consent is impractical and “only after 
consideration and approval of a research ethics committee.”48 
B. Tuskegee and the Belmont Report 
The United States revolutionized its research standards in the 1970s 
after the public learned of the unethical Tuskegee research. This research, 
conducted in Macon County, Alabama on African American men with 
syphilis, lasted from 1932 to 1972.49 Through these studies, research 
participants were withheld treatment for syphilis for years or even decades 
after a cure was available to allow researchers to study the long-term 
effects of syphilis.50 
Following the public outcry surrounding the revelation of the 
Tuskegee experiments, Congress passed the National Research Act, which 
was signed into law on July 12, 1974.51 This Act established the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, which on April 18, 1979, released the Belmont 
Report.52 The authors of the Belmont Report identified three basic 
principles that were found to be particularly relevant to human subjects 
research: (i) Respect for Persons; (ii) Beneficence; and (iii) Justice.53 
 
 48. Id. ¶ 32. 
 49. Tuskegee was not the only instance of depriving research subjects of effective 
treatment in the United State post-World War II. See generally Michael A. Rodriguez & 
Robert Garcia, First, Do No Harm: The US Sexually Transmitted Disease Experiments in 
Guatemala, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2122 (2013); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY 
OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, “ETHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE” STD RESEARCH IN GUATEMALA FROM 
1946–1948 (2011), available at https://bit.ly/2IL0BBM [hereinafter PCSBI, STD 
RESEARCH].  From 1946 through 1948, a series of immoral and unethical research 
experiments were undertaken by the United States government, with the cooperation of the 
Guatemalan authorities, on more than 5,128 Guatemalan individuals, who were 
intentionally infected with bacteria that causes sexually transmitted diseases, including 
syphilis and gonorrhea, without their knowledge or consent. See Rodriguez & Garcia, 
supra; see also PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N, supra. The public was not aware of these 
experiments at the time of the Belmont Report, as these studies only came to light in May 
2010 when the original research records were discovered and made public. See PCSBI, 
STD RESEARCH, supra, at 4. 
 50. See, e.g., U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/index.html (last updated 
Dec. 14, 2015). 
 51. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974). 
 52. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U. S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE 
BELMONT REPORT (1979), https://bit.ly/2VKZgQq. 
 53. Id. at 4. 
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Respect for Persons is described as a conjunction of at least two 
ethical foundations, “that individuals should be treated as autonomous 
agents” and “that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to 
protection.”54 Beneficence, the quality or state of doing good, 
encompasses an obligation to act in a kind and charitable manner toward 
people. The principle of Beneficence was intended to apply not just to 
individual studies, but to the “entire enterprise of research,” as a caution 
against causing harm in the name of science.55 The principle of Justice is 
concerned with how the benefits—and harms—of research should be 
distributed among society. The Belmont Report describes how justice has 
its roots in equality, what considerations justify departure from equality, 
and how to distribute the benefits and burdens of research.56 The Belmont 
Report sought to use these principles to “provide an analytical framework” 
through which ethical concerns regarding research could be resolved.57 It 
also introduced a concept of applying higher standards when research 
involves public funds.58 
Applying these principles, the Belmont Report describes a 
framework of informed consent requirements for medical research. The 
authors of the Belmont Report acknowledged that there was an ongoing 
debate of the nature and possibility of informed consent; however, the 
Report states that respect for persons demands that individuals should have 
the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them.59 
Researchers should explain “the research procedure, their purposes, risks 
and anticipated benefits, alternative procedures (where therapy is 
involved), and a statement offering the subject the opportunity to ask 
questions and to withdraw at any time.”60 This commitment to a respect 
for persons, their rights, and their ability to control their involvement in 
research provides an introduction into the role of privacy and 
confidentiality into the informed consent process. 
 
 54. Id. at 4–5. 
 55. Id. at 5. 
 56. For example, justice is concerned with ensuring vulnerable or disenfranchised 
populations are not systematically selected “simply because of their easy availability, their 
compromised position, or their manipulability.” Id. at 5–6. 
 57. See id. at 3.  
 58. The Belmont Report notes that with research there is not one common approach 
to how much information, or what sort of information an individual should be provided in 
connection with a research study. However, the standards in the Report provide certain 
frameworks, including that a researcher should never withhold information about risks, and 
always give truthful answers to direct questions about research; the information provided 
must be comprehensible and should be tailored to the audience receiving it; and a valid 
consent must be voluntary, and without coercion and undue influence. Id. at 4–9. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. 
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C. The Common Rule - Establishing Uniform Federal Agency 
Standards for Research 
If the Belmont Report announced the government’s principles on 
research ethics, the Common Rule created a uniform set of regulatory 
requirements and standards that apply to federal agencies involved with 
research. After the Tuskegee abuses, the Office for Protection from 
Research Risk (OPRR) was established, a predecessor to OHRP.61 OHRP 
is tasked with protecting human subjects in biomedical and behavioral 
research and providing leadership to federal agencies that conduct or 
support such research.62 
In 1991, directed by the leadership of OPRR, fifteen Federal 
departments and agencies codified, in separate regulations, a united set of 
human subject research protections known as the “Common Rule.”63 For 
the first time, these agencies took a consistent, directed approach to 
applying protections to human subject research. 
As noted, the Common Rule applies to all human subjects research64 
conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by the federal 
government or otherwise covered by an OHRP approved federal-wide 
assurance.65 Consent is at the heart of the Common Rule’s requirements. 
The Common Rule imposes a series of requirements on non-exempt 
research, including, for example, IRB review and approval of research66 
and informed consent requirements.67 
D. Development of Rights of Privacy and Confidentiality in 
Research 
However, privacy and confidentiality were still not the focus of the 
Common Rule. Although the concept of a privacy and the right to be left 
alone was contemplated as a Constitutional right at least as early as 
William Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s influential 1890 Harvard Law 
review article, “The Right to Privacy,”68 enforcement of privacy rights of 
 
 61. See OHRP History, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about-ohrp/history/index.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2016). 
 62. See Notice Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 
45 Fed. Reg. 37136 (June 13, 2000) (outlining the full responsibilities of the OHRP). 
 63. See HHS, Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 18. 
 64. Human subject research includes, inter alia, research using identifiable private 
information. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1) (2018). 
 65. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2018).  
 66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2018). 
 67. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2018). 
 68. Frequently referred to as one of the more influential writing on the topic of privacy 
rights, even in the 19th century Warren and Brandeis recognized the growing role of 
technology played at creating an open society where “what is whispered in the closet shall 
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individuals was generally linked to a collection of various common law 
court decisions and state law requirements for many years.69 
The introduction of federal standards related to privacy in health care 
matters came with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996, (HIPAA), signed into law on August 21, 1996.70 In accordance 
with requirements in the 1996 law, on December 28, 2000, HHS finalized 
its “Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information” 
(the Privacy Rule).71 
The overarching purpose of the Privacy Rule is to develop standards 
and requirements related to the electronic transmission of health 
information, with a particular focus on the privacy of an individual’s 
health information.72 The Privacy Rule actually protects confidentiality, 
not privacy. Privacy is the right to be left alone—in this context, to choose 
not to share one’s personal information with anyone. For medical data, 
privacy has never been an attainable goal. People have always been forced 
to divulge highly sensitive information to treating professionals, because 
doing so was the only way to secure adequate treatment. Confidentiality—
the right to prevent further disclosure of personal information one has 
chosen to divulge to another—underscored the patient-physician 
relationship long before being enshrined in statutes and regulations. 
Thus, unlike the Common Rule, HIPAA’s central purpose is privacy 
and confidentiality, not the protection of research subjects. That said, 
while not the main thrust, HIPAA is also concerned with the protection of 
data for use in research.73 Around the time that the Privacy Rule was being 
developed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that 
 
be proclaimed from the house-tops.” Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).   
 69. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, GW 
LAW SCHOLARLY COMMONS (2006), https://bit.ly/2w0mfMF. 
 70. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 71. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). HHS subsequently 
published its “Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information” (the 
Security Rule) in 2003, see Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 
8334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164), and a rule implementing 
enforcement standards in 2006, see HIPAA Administrative Implication: Enforcement, 71 
Fed. Reg. 8390 (Feb. 16, 2006) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). The Privacy Rule has 
subsequently been amended several times, most notably through significant modifications 
published in 2002, see Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164), and 
with the final Omnibus Rule that implemented provisions from the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH Act), see Modifications to the 
HITECH Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
 72. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 82463. 
 73. Id. at 82691.  
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Common Rule protections were not adequately addressing issues of 
privacy and confidentiality in the research setting.74 Hence, one of the 
tenants of HIPAA driving the development of the Privacy Rule was 
establishing and protecting the rights individuals have in connection with 
their individually identifiable health information, which includes data use 
in research settings.75 
As a result, there is significant overlap in requirements between the 
Common Rule and HIPAA, particularly in settings where research is 
primarily or exclusively based on the use of health data, rather than direct 
involvement with a research subject. In research involving health data, 
concerns about privacy tend to be more salient than concerns of physical 
harm to an individual. As HHS has stated: “informed consent laws place 
limits on the ability of other persons to intrude physically on a person’s 
body. Similar concerns apply to intrusions on information about the 
person.”76 
Generally, a HIPAA covered entity may not use or disclose PHI 
without informed consent from the patient in form of a valid written 
authorization77 unless an exception applies or the use or disclosure is 
otherwise permitted under the Privacy Rule.78 For example, a covered 
entity may use PHI for its own treatment, payment, and health care 
operations without obtaining patient consent.79 In addition, HIPAA 
provides a number of different exemptions where PHI may be used or 
 
 74. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-55, MEDICAL RECORD 
PRIVACY: ACCESS NEEDED FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, BUT OVERSIGHT OF PRIVACY 
PROTECTIONS IS LIMITED 13, 16 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/226921.pdf. 
 75. See HHS, HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 20.  
 76. Comments related to informed consent drew the largest complement of the tens of 
thousands of comments submitted regarding the Privacy Rule proposed rule. See Standards 
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82464. 
 77. As with informed consent under the Common Rule, a valid patient authorization 
under HIPAA must be written in plain language and contain several core elements. 45 
C.F.R. §164.508(c) (2018) (highlighting that in addition to the core elements, a valid 
authorization must contain statements adequate to place the individual on notice of: (i) the 
individual’s right to revoke the authorization in writing; (ii) the ability or inability to 
condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on the authorization; 
and (iii) the potential for information disclosed pursuant to the authorization to be subject 
to re-disclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by HIPAA requirements). 
 78. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a). Also note that on December 15, 2017, the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) released further guidance on obtaining an individual authorization for 
the use and disclosure of PHI. See generally Guidance on HIPAA and Individual 
Authorization of Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information for Research, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (June 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2HQ7sI4. 
 79. A covered entity can also disclose PHI for another covered entity’s treatment or 
payment operations, and, in certain circumstances, its health care operations purposes. 
Other HIPAA requirements may apply, such as requiring that only the minimum necessary 
amount of PHI for the intended purposes be disclosed. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2018).  
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disclosed without patient authorization, including uses and disclosure for 
research.80 Specifically, for research proposals a covered entity can seek 
an alteration or waiver of informed consent requirements from a HIPAA 
Privacy Board or IRB.81 
E. A Growing Harmony of Privacy and Consent—Revisions to 
the Common Rule and Applicability to Big Data Research 
The Common Rule underwent major modification as a result of a 
2017 final rule82 that, after a series of delays, went into effect on January 
21, 2019.83 These were the first major changes to the Common Rule since 
it was issued in 1991. These revisions were originally scheduled to take 
effect in 2018, and are thus referred to as the “2018 Regulations.”84 In the 
preamble to the final rule, HHS describes that changes were needed given 
dramatic changes to human subject research that have occurred since 1991, 
such as evolving health record technologies, the integration of multiple 
types of data, the Internet, the Human Genome Project, and the 
corresponding development of precision medicine and genomic 
sequencing.85 
The preamble to the final rule also notes that research continues to 
grow outside of the biomedical research setting and into clinical care 
settings, where research and medical data are combined.86 As a result, 
while the Belmont Report is cited as a continued major influence on 
human subjects research in the United States, OHRP recognizes that the 
nature of risk and benefits described in the Belmont Report has evolved, 
particularly as more studies involve secondary analysis of data, rather than 
direct involvement with research subjects.87 In keeping with that 
recognition, the 2018 Requirements include a provision that the federal 
government must consult with “appropriate experts (including experts in 
data matching and re-identification)” periodically—and no less than every 
 
 80. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2018) (highlighting specific uses and disclosures for 
research purposes). 
 81. Id. (listing specific criteria that an IRB or privacy board must document). 
 82. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 and other scattered sections). 
 83. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of the 
General Compliance Date of Revisions, 83 Fed. Reg. 28497, 28497 (June 19, 2018) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 and other scattered sections). 
 84. See Terminology: Terms Related to the Revised Common Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy 
/regulations/terminology/index.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2018). 
 85. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7151. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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four years—to ascertain how data or samples may be identifiable.88 OHRP 
states that this process responds to the growing volume of information 
being generated and shared in research “and evolving technology that can 
ease and speed the ability to re-identify information . . . previously 
considered nonidentifiable.”89 
The 2018 Regulations reflect a heightened sensitivity to the need for 
truly informed consent by research subjects. Informed consent for 
primary, patient-interaction research must now specify whether the data 
collected will be de-identified and used for other research in the future.90 
In addition, several new informed consent elements were introduced, 
requiring a notice about the possibility of commercial profit, whether 
clinically relevant research results will be returned to the subjects, and 
whether research activities will or might include whole genome 
sequencing.91 Further, some standards under existing elements were 
revised. For example, the degree of information provided to a prospective 
subject must now be what “a reasonable person would want to have in 
order to make an informed decision about whether to participate” in a 
study.92 Information is also required to be presented in a manner that 
“facilitates an understanding of why one might, or might not, want to 
participate.”93 OHRP has stated that its goal is to have what it recognizes 
to be complicated information distilled in a way that is easier for more 
people to understand.94 
Conversely, the 2018 Regulations make a number of changes that 
indicate an effort to unclutter the path to conducting secondary research 
on Big Data collections. One key new exemption looks to harmonize 
requirements between the Common Rule and HIPAA for certain 
secondary research uses regulated under HIPAA (the “HIPAA 
Exemption”).95 The HIPAA Exemption permits the secondary research use 
of identifiable private information when: (i) the research involves only 
information collection and analysis involving the investigator’s use of 
 
 88. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(7)(i) (2018). 
 89. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7169. 
 90. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(9) (2018). 
 91. Id. § 46.116(c)(7)–(9). 
 92. Id. § 46.116(a)(4). 
 93. Id. § 46.116(a)(5)(i). 
 94. Revised Common Rule Q&As, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://bit.ly/2W2zDyH (last updated July 30, 2018). 
 95. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(iii) (2018). Other exemptions include secondary research 
using publicly available information; secondary research using information recorded in a 
way that the investigator cannot readily ascertain the identity of the individuals; and 
secondary research conducted by or on behalf of a federal entity and involving the use of 
federally generated non-research information, provided that the original collection was 
subject to specific federal privacy protections and continues to be protected. Id. § 
46.104(d)(4)(i), (ii), (iv). 
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identifiable health information; and (ii) that use is regulated under the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule for the purposes of “health care operations” or 
“research” as those terms are defined at 45 C.F.R. § 164.501, or for “public 
health activities,” as described under 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b).96 As a result, 
for covered entities that are governed by HIPAA, or for their collaborators, 
the majority of proposed secondary research activities involving 
identifiable information will not require additional Common Rule 
compliance, as the HIPAA Exemption would apply. That said, recent 
recommendation from SACHRP clarified that the HIPAA Exemption does 
not apply to research involving identifiable biospecimens or genetic 
information (as opposed to identifiable private information).97 SACHRP 
reasons that the HIPAA Exemption was intended to apply only to 
“information,” and not human samples, as otherwise the HIPAA 
Exemption would “subvert the greater protection afforded to identifiable 
biospecimens under the modernized Common Rule.”98 
Another means by which the Common Rule attempts to facilitate the 
conduct of secondary research is through the introduction a new “broad 
consent” mechanism that allows institutions to seek upfront, broad consent 
from patients to permit future secondary research. Under the pre-2018 
Requirement, an informed consent document had to be study-specific.99 
However, under the new broad consent mechanism—rather than requiring 
a specific description of the research to be conducted with an individual’s 
data—a consent form can provide “a general description of the types of 
research that may be conducted” with the data “sufficient . . . such that a 
reasonable person would expect the broad consent would permit the types 
of research conducted.”100 As discussed in more detail in Part IV, while 
broad consent presents new options and flexibilities to research 
organizations to engage in secondary research, a number of significant 
limitations create doubt about how widely it will be used. 
F. The EU’s Retreat toward Individual Prerogative 
While in the United States the regulatory trends have been toward 
greater flexibility to conduct secondary research using Big Data, the 
European Union (EU) has attempted the opposite tack. The EU Parliament 
adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, and it 
became fully implemented as law in all Member States on May 25, 
 
 96. Id. § 46.104(d)(4)(iii). 
 97. See Attachment B – Interpretation Revised Common Rule Exemptions, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2HEnhDI (last updated Nov. 19, 2018).  
 98. Id. 
 99. Attachment C – Recommendations for Broad Consent Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2QaGbFY (last updated Aug. 2, 2017). 
 100. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2018). 
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2018.101 The GDPR establishes a framework to protect the privacy and 
personal data of individuals and is applicable to the European Economic 
Area (“EEA”).102 
The GDPR greatly expands an individual’s rights regarding personal 
information in a broad range of circumstances and focuses on the 
protection of “personal data,” which is defined as any “information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject.’).”103 
Data subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, 
especially by reference to “an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity of that natural person.”104 GDPR prohibits the processing 
of personal data without a lawful basis, which may be established where 
the data subject has given consent to the processing.105 For consent to be 
valid, the consent must be freely given, specific, informed, and 
unambiguous.106 Significantly for this discussion, the GDPR imposes 
more stringent requirements on “special categories” of Personal Data, 
which includes health data.107 
While Personal Data is defined broadly, it is possible for data to be 
de-identified to the point of anonymization, in which case GDPR 
requirements no longer apply.108 The GDPR standard for anonymization 
is far more difficult to satisfy than HIPAA’s de-identification safe harbor, 
as GDPR requires an evaluation of “all the means reasonably likely to be 
used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to 
identify the natural person directly or indirectly.”109 For example, while 
one data point containing an individual’s information may not be sufficient 
to identify the individual, data will not be considered de-identified if it 
 
 101. GDPR, supra note 25, at 87.  
 102. Id. The EU’s retreat toward individual prerogative related to data privacy has 
ripple effects that extend out over the Atlantic. Also, as noted by HHS, “the GDPR will 
apply directly to, and will directly regulate, much of the U.S.-based use and processing of 
personal data that have been collected in the EEA for clinical and other research purposes.” 
The problems with compliance “confront U.S.-based researchers, institutions, research 
funders (such as the NIH), and industry sponsors of research, including private 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical device companies, as they seek to use personal 
data collected at research sites based in the EEA and transferred to the U.S.” Attachment B 
– European Union’s General Data Protection Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS.,  https://bit.ly/2JtILpZ (last updated Apr. 13, 2018). 
 103. GDPR, supra note 25, at 33. 
 104. Id. 
 105. GDPR Key Issues: Consent, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-
info.eu/issues/consent/ (last visited Aug 1, 2019). 
 106. GDPR, supra note 25, at 34. 
 107. Id. at 6, 38–39. 
 108. Id. at 5, 39.  
 109. Id. at 5. 
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could be used in conjunction with another data point to identify the 
individual. As a result, it is difficult to accurately determine whether a 
particular data set has been de-identified to the extent that it may be 
considered anonymized, especially when the data in question is health 
data, which may be more likely to be individually identifiable than other 
data. 
GDPR’s adoption has caused nervousness among researchers 
because, in addition to the aspects discussed above, GDPR provides many 
individual rights, notably including the “right to be forgotten,” which 
confers on individuals the right to compel erasure of their personal data 
without undue delay.110 Further, an independent European advisory body 
on data protection and privacy has noted that “if a controller chooses to 
rely on consent for any part of the processing, they must be prepared to 
respect that choice and stop that part of the processing if an individual 
withdraws consent.”111 
However, alarm in the research community about the effects of 
GDPR may prove to be unwarranted. GDPR allows processing of special 
category personal data, such as health data, even in the absence of explicit 
consent where 
processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in 
accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law 
which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of 
the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific 
measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the 
data subject.112  
Moreover, and quite significantly for secondary research situations, 
where the lawful purpose for processing personal data is for scientific 
research, a data subject’s right to have Personal Data erased by a controller 
or processor may be derogated where exercise of that right is “likely to 
render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of 
that processing.”113 
 
 
 
 
 110. Id. at 43–44. 
 111. Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679, at 
23, WP259 rev.01 (Apr. 10, 2018), https://bit.ly/2AnooDX; see also European 
Commission Press Release, The Article 29 Working Party Ceased to Exist as of 25 May 
2018 (June 11, 2018), https://bit.ly/2wbEJda. 
 112. GDPR, supra note 25, at 39. 
 113. Id. at 44.  
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III. CHALLENGES WITH CURRENT REGULATIONS FOR BIG DATA 
RESEARCH 
Big Data has been shown to be useful in advancing biomedical 
research.114 For researchers, especially at academic medical centers where 
enormous quantities of useful patient data are readily available, getting 
past regulatory hurdles to secure access to big databases is almost always 
going to be worth the effort. Except where an institution or its IRB is 
especially risk averse, proponents of establishing large research databases 
will encounter few impediments, and project-specific proposals to study 
those databases will be approved. Nonetheless, legal and ethical problems 
persist. 
First, and fundamentally, patients expect that their right to privacy 
will be respected, though attitudes about privacy are complicated and 
evolving. The Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose to the 
Privacy Act of 1974 observes that “the privacy of an individual is directly 
affected by the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal 
information” and that “the increasing use of computers and sophisticated 
information technology, while essential to the efficient operations of the 
Government, has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can 
occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal 
information.”115 Since the Privacy Act was written, the increased use of 
computers and sophisticated information technology has developed at a 
pace that surely was not anticipated by most of society in 1974. In response 
to the ever-increasing magnitude of harm that can occur from misused 
personal information, society’s opinion on the protection of personal 
information has evolved and become nuanced over the past few decades. 
Yet as privacy issues have increased with each passing decade, the 
United States has opted to address privacy concerns through piecemeal 
regulatory schemes that protect only certain types of information, rather 
than through comprehensive legislation such as GDPR. This approach has 
led to a collection of narrow federal laws that cover many types of personal 
information, including health information, school records, and financial 
records, among others.116 As noted by Allan Friedman, a great example of 
the United States’ “patchwork response” to the public’s privacy concerns 
is the protection of video-rental records.117 In response to a newspaper that 
revealed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video-rental history, 
 
 114. Cheung, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
 115. Privacy Act of 1974 and Amendments, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/privacy_act.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2008). 
 116. See Solove, supra note 69, §§ 1:4–1:5. 
 117. Jonathan Shaw, Exposed: The erosion of privacy in the Internet era, HARV. MAG., 
Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 38, 40–41, http://www.harvardmag.com/pdf/2009/09-pdfs/0909-
38.pdf.   
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Congress passed a video-rental records protection law, and for nearly 10 
years video-rental records had stronger privacy protections than financial 
records or medical records.118 Moreover, even though the U.S. provides 
protection for health data, this protection is not absolute as “[m]uch of the 
health-related information generated today is not regulated by 
[HIPAA].”119 
This panoply of privacy laws protecting personal information, 
combined with massive data breaches, has not resulted in a society that is 
confident in the protection of personal information. In 2017, a survey 
found that roughly half of Americans (i) are “not confident at all” or “not 
too confident” that the federal government is able to keep their personal 
information safe and (ii) believe that their personal information is less 
secure in 2017 than it was five years prior.120 This lack of confidence is 
likely related to the fact that 64% of Americans report personally 
experiencing a “major data breach.”121 
Additionally, 93% of adults agreed that being in control of who can 
access their personal information is “[v]ery important” or “[s]omewhat 
important.”122 The same poll found that 90% of adults agree that 
controlling what information is collected about them is “[v]ery important” 
or “[s]omewhat important.”123 Public opinion polls show that the public 
understands the importance of protecting their personal information—but 
only 50% feel confident that they can understand requests to use their 
personal information,124 and 91% of Americans “agree” or “strongly 
agree” that people “have lost control over how personal information is 
collected and used by” various entities.125 
Moreover, in regard to health information technology (“health IT”), 
polling has shown a favorable shift in public opinion. In the early 2000s, 
respondents were concerned about exposure of private medical 
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information and privacy risks associated with EMRs.126 In a 2005 study 
seeking views on the prospect of medical records being housed on a 
nationwide system of EMRs, 70% of respondents were concerned that 
personal medical information could be leaked due to lack of data security, 
69% expressed concern that there could be sharing of medical information 
without the patient’s knowledge, and 69% were concerned that computer 
systems would lack sufficient data security.127 
However, by 2011, the public had gained faith in health IT.128 A 2011 
paper shows that 78% of those surveyed favored the use of EMRs in 
doctor’s offices and 78% also believed that EMRs were likely to improve 
healthcare.129 While 48% of respondents indicated that they were “very 
concerned” about the privacy of medical records, a majority of 
respondents (68%) believed that EMRs were “very or somewhat secure, 
and 64 percent . . . agreed or strongly agreed that the expected benefit of 
EMRs outweigh[ed] potential risks to privacy.”130 
In addition to respect for privacy—or confidentiality—the research 
community should be concerned with preserving trust by ensuring that 
patients know whether and how their private information may be used in 
research. Existing mechanisms don’t get us there. 
First, as discussed in the Introduction, the concept of informed 
consent itself may be stretched beyond its usefulness where Big Data is 
concerned. Moreover, under the Common Rule, it has long been the case 
that secondary use of big databases can occur regardless of consent where 
the data are de-identified or where the IRB grants a waiver of informed 
consent.131 (As discussed below, de-identification can in some ways be 
considered a fiction that provides false assurance to investigators and the 
public that confidentiality will be preserved.) An IRB may waive all or 
some of the required elements of informed consent where the research is 
of “no more than minimal risk to the subjects,” “could not be practicably 
carried out without the . . . waiver,” and the waiver “will not adversely 
affect the rights and welfare of the [research] subjects.”132 Thus, while it 
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is surely the case that IRBs usually make the right decisions about waiver 
and are careful to ensure that the waiver will not adversely affect the 
research subjects, the fact remains that the decision to allow the research 
is divorced from knowledge or permission of the research subjects. 
The new HIPAA Exemption introduces an interesting wrinkle to the 
ethical considerations in Big Data research. As is explained in Part II 
above, the exemption provides that secondary research involving 
identifiable information may proceed without consent where the use is 
regulated under the HIPAA Privacy Rule for the purposes of “health care 
operations,”  “research,” or for “public health activities and purposes.”133 
Thus, identifiable information may be used in research where an 
authorization was signed simultaneously with the consent for treatment, 
meaning that the patient met with a provider motivated by two somewhat 
competing purposes, given that conducting research is an act taken on 
behalf of society and not of the individual research subject. Alternatively 
a provider’s Notice of Privacy Practices, required under the Privacy Rule, 
may state simply that the provider “may use and share [the patient’s] 
information for health research.”134 Beyond that information, a patient is 
unaware of research ever happening if the researcher is able to obtain a 
waiver of authorization—a common occurrence. 
Broad consent, while admirably geared towards fuller disclosure, is 
unlikely to be used as currently structured, for at least two reasons. First, 
the information required to be disclosed to a patient may be difficult to 
ascertain. The research team must disclose fairly detailed information 
about future conditions that cannot be known, such as “[a] general 
description of the types of research that may be conducted” with the 
patient’s identifiable information, the identifiable information that may be 
used, whether sharing of the information might occur, what types of 
institutions or researchers might be allowed to use the information, and the 
 
information in an identifiable format. “Whenever appropriate,” the subjects, if waiver is 
granted, are to be provided with “additional pertinent information after participation.” Id. 
 133. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(iii) (2018). SACHRP has advised that the drafters of the 
2018 Regulations included “health care operations and “public health activities and 
purposes” as bases for the exemption because under the Privacy Rule a project is 
considered research only if the primary purpose of the activity is the creation of generalized 
knowledge—as opposed to the Common Rule, where a purpose but not the primary 
purpose must be the creation of generalized knowledge. Given that health care operations 
and public health activities could include as a secondary purpose the creation of generalized 
knowledge, it was appropriate to include those purposes in the exemption. See Attachment 
B – Recommendations on the Interpretation and Application of §_.104(d)(4) the “HIPAA 
Exemption,” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://bit.ly/2VFTBL6 (last 
updated on Dec. 15, 2017). 
 134. Jennifer Kulynych & Henry T. Greely, Clinical genomics, big data, and electronic 
medical records: reconciling patient rights with research when privacy and science 
collide, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 94, 111 (2017).  
 2019 PRIVACY AND INFORMED CONSENT 727 
periods of time during which the information might be stored and used.135 
In regard to the last requirement, the periods of time may be indefinite,136 
but disclosure that information will be stored and used for an indefinite 
period is not likely to be viewed favorably by the person being asked to 
consent. If the point of broad consent is to facilitate ongoing secondary 
research with biomedical data, requiring these elements will either lead to 
informed consent disclosures that are inaccurate or are so vague as to be 
useless. In neither case is the patient’s best interest served. A second, more 
critical impediment is that when broad consent is refused by a patient, the 
information clearly cannot be used—but in addition an IRB cannot waive 
consent for the storage, maintenance, or secondary research use of the 
information.137 Setting up a system to flag the records of patients who have 
declined to give broad consent and to prevent their identifiable information 
from being used through a waiver will require significant deployment of 
IT resources. In addition, SACHRP has cautioned institutions against de-
identifying data in response to a patient’s refusal to provide broad consent, 
noting that while such an action technically may not be a regulatory 
violation, it would “offend accepted ethical precepts of human subjects 
research.”138 The likely result is that few institutions will make use of 
broad consent.139 
As an aside, it is worth noting that both under HIPAA and the 
Common Rule, assumptions that data claimed to be de-identified truly are 
de-identified may be suspect in an era where so much information about 
people is readily discoverable. Data scientists have long urged that a 
dichotomous view of data as either identifiable or not is inaccurate and 
unhelpful.140 More accurate is the view that “[i]dentifiability exists on a 
continuum, and the range of deidentification techniques, such as 
pseudonymization, linking, anonymization, and single and double coding, 
illustrates the fundamental problem with the bimodal approach.”141 
Notorious examples abound of people being identified by linking 
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deidentified data to publicly available data. One involved then-
Massachusetts Governor William Weld, who assured the public that a state 
agency has protected patient privacy when it deleted some identifiers—
but not ZIP codes, birth dates, and sex—before making available for 
researchers every Massachusetts state employee’s hospital records.142 
Eighty-seven percent of the American population can be identified 
through use of ZIP code, date of birth, and sex.143 Weld found his own 
medical records identified by Latanya Sweeney, then a graduate student 
and now a Professor of Government and Technology at Harvard 
University. Sweeney knew that Weld lived in Cambridge, MA and 
combined the purportedly deidentified records with the voter rolls of the 
city of Cambridge, a database that included the name, address ZIP code, 
birth date, and sex of every voter in the city. 144 Only six people in 
Cambridge shared Weld’s birth date; three of those people were men, and 
only one—Weld—lived in his ZIP code. “In a theatrical flourish, Dr. 
Sweeney sent the governor’s health records (including diagnoses and 
prescriptions) to his office.”145 Sweeney went on to conduct several 
influential studies involving reidentification, in one of which she 
demonstrated that newspaper stories about hospital visits in the State of 
Washington, where anonymized health records are made available, led to 
identifying matching health records 43% of the time.146 
The unsettling findings from these and similar studies do not mean 
that deidentification should be abandoned as a goal or promise, and it 
would be unthinkable for regulators to take the position that sensitive 
personal data could not be accumulated at all because of the risks of 
identification, even where data were deidentified. What is indicated is 
honesty about deidentification in the information age. Otherwise HIPAA 
authorization and informed consent under the Common Rule become 
shams. 
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IV. TOWARDS A MIDDLE GROUND 
A. Societal Advantage vs. Individual Autonomy 
While everyone agrees that privacy is important and most people say 
that their privacy rights are critical, how people actually act may tell a 
different tale. The Pew Research Center has reported that the percentage 
of Americans using social media platforms grew from 5% to 69% between 
2005 and 2018, with growth across all age groups.147 During the same 
period of growth in social media usage,  a 2014 Pew survey found 91% of 
Americans 
“agree” or “strongly agree” that people have lost control over how 
personal information is collected and used by all kinds of entities. 
Some 80% of social media users said they were concerned about 
advertisers and businesses accessing data they share on social media 
platforms, and 64% said the government should do more to regulate 
advertisers.148 
However, the study also found that people overwhelmingly continue to 
use social media platforms despite having concerns about the implications 
for their privacy.149 
Some commentators argue that data privacy is based on data 
responsibility, and that the United States should understand protecting data 
privacy to be a responsibility of individuals as well as governments and 
businesses.150 While framing this responsibility as a moral duty, as one 
scholar does,151 may be a stretch for many, it does seem reasonable that 
individuals should take ownership over how their data is disclosed and 
used. The problem is that exercising such ownership becomes 
impracticable if doing so means that one is unable to participate in society 
and its benefits (such as health care) and pleasures—(such as social 
interactions via Facebook, Snapchat, etc.) Further, protecting one’s own 
privacy can be an impossibility in the age of Big Data, where methods of 
collection and analysis can overcome even the most informed consumer’s 
capacity to shield confidential information.152 One can quit Facebook, but 
not an electronic medical record. 
Security breaches involving medical records will continue to occur 
for a variety of reasons, such as poor oversight, inadequate security 
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training, and susceptibility to phishing.153 Happily, however, most people 
favor letting researchers use their personal data.154 Considered together 
with the concurrent concerns for autonomy regarding personal data, that 
tolerance for research use of data may suggest possibilities for a middle 
ground approach to broad consent that is truly informative and does not 
over-promise individual autonomy. 
B. Toward a “True” Broad Consent 
Current regulatory schemes generally promise research subjects more 
autonomy than they actually provide. Of the existing mechanisms, the IRB 
waiver is probably the simplest to administer and, assuming IRBs have the 
best interests of research subjects at heart, may well provide enough 
protection for the subjects without impeding Big Data research. Some 
scholars argue for blanket consent, where patients consent to any future 
research on their data or biospecimens, without having been provided 
information on future uses and with no further oversight.155 Others 
advocate for open consent, such as has been used in the Personal Genome 
Project, where donors are asked to consent to their data being included in 
an open-access database with no privacy guarantees. The latter approach 
seems workable only in a society where prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of genetics and medical conditions are 
available and rigorously enforced. 
Broad consent is a salutary idea but, as demonstrated, is not 
practicable in its current form. It is simply too difficult to predict the types 
of research that may be conducted with the patient’s identifiable 
information, the identifiable information that may be used, whether 
sharing of the information might occur, what types of institutions or 
researchers might be allowed to use the information, and the periods of 
time that the information might be stored and used. Any statement of these 
conditions will either limit the usefulness of a Big Dataset or be so vague 
as to utterly fail to ensure that the consent is truly informed consent. 
Moreover, the current requirement that if broad consent is refused an IRB 
is perpetually barred from waiving consent as to that patient creates too 
great a logistical and compliance challenge to make broad consent worth 
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pursuing when other options, though less transparent to the research 
subject, are readily at hand. 
What’s needed is a form of consent that provides patients with a 
reasonable amount of information about how their data will be used and 
honors the altruistic motivation to contribute, through facilitating research, 
to the greater good. Though broad consent may not be feasible or desirable 
for all types of biomedical Big Databases, one can envision a form of 
broad consent that honored patient autonomy in reasonable ways without 
creating unworkable barriers to the conduct of secondary research with 
medical Big Data. To achieve that goal, providers would need to be honest 
and straightforward about risks and benefits, and the limitations of data 
security measures, and the condition—which we advocate—that refusal to 
grant broad consent would not prevent one’s data being used in a study 
through waiver. 
Assuming that the type of database was appropriate for broad 
consent—and some data, such as substance abuse treatment records, might 
be deemed too sensitive—a key component of broad consent should be 
patient education. People being asked to provide a broad consent should 
be told, at a minimum and in addition to the general requirements for 
informed consent: 
 
(1) That their medical data will be aggregated into a large database 
for reseasrch use in one or more studies. 
(2) That research may be conducted by employees of the primary 
custodian or by researchers from other entities. 
(3) That no researchers will be allowed access to the data without 
agreeing to terms of use, including strict observation of 
confidentiality provisions. 
(4) That it cannot be guaranteed with 100% certainty that no data 
breach will occur, though every effort will be made to prevent 
such an occurrence, and that they will be notified in the event of 
a breach. 
(5) That the nature of the research conducted using their data, while 
it will meet ethical standards and will be for improvement of 
health and well-being, may vary widely. 
(6) That broad consent can be revoked at any time. That if they 
decline to give broad consent they might be contacted to see if 
they will consent to their data being used for a specific research 
study. 
(7) That it is always the case that in certain circumstances reviewing 
research ethics boards might conclude that it is permissible to 
conduct a study using their medical data without their consent, 
but only if the study is of no more than minimal risk to the 
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subjects, could not be practicably carried out without the waiver, 
and the waiver will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of 
the research subjects.  
 
Patients armed with the foregoing details, given in plain and 
unadorned terms, would then be asked to answer one question: “Do you 
agree at the present time to have your medical data made available for one 
or more research studies under the terms just described to you?” If the 
answer were yes, and appropriate signatures followed, broad consent 
would be put into place and remain in effect until revoked. 
One can reasonably question why broad consent should be pursued 
at all if refusal can be circumvented by waiver. The simple answer is that 
more information in such matters is generally better. Removing the heavy 
technological burden that accompanies refusals of broad consent under the 
current Common Rule, along with other streamlining measures, would 
encourage rather than discourage its use. Balancing a refusal with waivers 
in appropriate circumstances does not put the patient at risk for 
unwarranted harm,156 and, again, the patient should be told that a waiver 
might be granted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The growth of secondary research projects driven by big data carries 
significant benefits to society, but also strains research institutions’ 
resources. An appropriate compliance function includes verifying that 
research will occur under a permissible consent ‘pathway;’ principally: 
obtaining informed consent, de-identifying patient data, or obtaining an 
appropriate IRB or Privacy Board waiver or modification of consent 
requirements. Increased research activities strains each of these three 
mechanisms—more consents are needed, or more data must be de-
identified, or a greater number of IRB/Privacy Board evaluations and (if 
appropriate) waivers will be required. 
As the pace of big data research increases, research oversight 
mechanisms must react in parallel. Regulators will continue to struggle to 
balance respect for individual autonomy with society’s needs for research 
to advance through the use of exciting new resources such as Big Data 
collections. The recent Common Rule changes reflect an incomplete 
solution to these challenges. In particular, the Broad Consent mechanism 
does not go far enough to bring meaningful changes to the informed 
consent process for big data research projects and is a procedure that fails 
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to align with its underlying goals. Rather than punishing institutions that 
follow this path by eliminating the waiver mechanism option if broad 
consent is pursued, true broad consent, we think, would strike an improved 
balance, allowing greater individual involvement in how data is used and 
lessening reliance on an IRB/Privacy Board waiver process, while still 
preserving waiver as an option when appropriate. 
 
